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THE SPECIAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY AND
THEORIES OF DIVINE ETERNITY
William Lane Craig

Recent theories of divine timeless eternity have appealed to the Special Theory of Relativity, either illustratively or substantively, in order to explicate
and defend the notion of a timeless God's being really related to temporal
moments and events. I argue that besides in some cases misusing STR. these
theories presuppose without justification a certain interpretation of STR
which. while widespread, is ill-founded and dubious.

Introduction
Although studies of divine eternity written during the previous generationsuch as Nelson Pike's standard work, God and Timelessness1-paid scant
attention to the nature of time insofar as it plays a role in physical theory,
contemporary analyses of divine eternity often make explicit appeal to physical theory, and particularly to the Special Theory of Relativity (STR), in
support of the doctrine of divine timelessness. This appeal may be primarily
illustrative, as in the case of the Stump-Kretzmann model of divine eternity.2
On the other hand, STR may play an essential role in the construction and
defense of the coherence of a model of divine eternity, as in Brian Leftow's
theory. 3 If the appeal to STR turns out to be nugatory, then in the former case
one has lost a physical analogy to one's theory and thereby any credibility
which that analogy may have lent to one's metaphysical model; but in the
latter case the results are more serious because with the removal of its relativistic underpinnings one's model collapses into incoherence.
It is important, therefore, especially for proponents of the latter sort of
model, that the legitimacy of the appeal to STR be thoroughly explored. It is
my fear, however, that this exercise has not been carried out by proponents
of divine timeless eternity and that as a result STR may have been both
misused and naively interpreted by them. In order to explore this question.
let us consider Leftow's recent exposition and defense of his theory.4

Examination of Leftow's Theory
Two fundamental tenets of Leftow's theory, namely, (i) that temporal things
exist both in time and in timeless eternity and (ii) that the timeless presence
of all things to God in eternity is compatible with objective temporal becoming, depend essentially upon the legitimacy of the application of Einsteinian
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relativity to temporal events in relation to God. Let us look more closely,
therefore, at Leftow's exposition and defense of these two tenets.
(i) The Existence of Temporal Things in Timeless Eternity

(a.) The Zero Thesis
Leftow bases his defense of (i) on what he calls the Zero Thesis: that the
distance between God and every spatial being is zero. The argument for this
thesis is simple: if God is not located in space, there can be no spatial distance
between God and spatial beings; therefore, there is none.
This argument seems to involve a category mistake, however. Leftow himself states the objection clearly:
... God is not the kind of thing of which we can affirm or deny distance:
... 'there can be no spatial distance between God and spatial creatures' is a
category-negation rather than an ordinary negation, and so its semantics are
such that it does not entail the Zero Thesis .... the Zero Thesis is actually
ill-formed. For it arguably is equivalent to 'there is a distance between God
and spatial creatures, and this distance is zero,' a conjunctive proposition
whose first conjunct the doctrine of categories declares nonsensical. s
One may not therefore validly infer from God's spacelessness that the distance between God and any spatial being is zero.
The foregoing objection seems to be well-founded. The dispute between
Lorentzian and Einsteinian Relativity provides a salient example from the
history of science of the crucial difference between a category-negation and
the negation of a property. Nineteenth century aether theories originally posited as the medium of transmission of electromagnetic radiation an invisible,
rigid liquid, like glass, which was nonetheless completely intangible and
utterly at rest with respect to absolute space. With the publication of his STR
paper in 1905, Einstein rejected the existence of the classical aether and along
with it the privileged rest frame. But in 1916, at the prompting of Lorentz
that the General Theory of Relativity (GTR) admits the possibility of a stationary aether, Einstein introduced a new relativistic conception of the ether:
the space-time itself as described by the metrical tensor gJlv. 6 When Einstein
lectured at Lorentz's University of Leiden in 1920, he drew a fundamental
distinction between the classical aether and his new relativistic ether on the
basis of the applicability of the category of motion to the aether frame:
As regards the mechanical nature of Lorentz's aether, one might say of it,
with a touch of humor, that immobility was the only mechanical property
which H. A. Lorentz left it. It may be added that the whole difference which
the special theory of relativity made in our conception of the aether lay in this,
that it divested the aether of its last mechanical quality, namely immobility ....
The most obvious viewpoint which could be taken of this matter appeared to
be the following. The aether does not exist at all.. ..
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However, closer reflection shows that this denial of the aether is not demanded by the special principle of relativity. We can assume the existence
of an aether; but we must abstain from ascribing a definitive state of motion
to it, i.e., we must by abstraction divest it of the last mechanical characteristic
which Lorentz had left it.. ..
Generalizing, we must say that we can conceive of extended physical objects
to which the concept of motion cannot be applied .... The special principle
of relativity forbids us to regard the aether as composed of particles, the
movements of which can be followed out through time, but the aether hypothesis as such is not incompatible with the special theory of relati vity. Only
we must take care not to ascribe a state of motion to the aether. 7

Privately Einstein confessed to Lorentz, "It would have been more right if I
had limited myself, in my previously published papers, to lay emphasis only
on the non-existence of any velocity of the ether instead of the defense of
the total non-existence of the ether."8
When Einstein denied a velocity or state of motion of the ether, he was
emphatically not ascribing to it the property of immobility. For that would
be to admit that the ether constitutes a reference frame, as Lorentz claimed,
and therefore serves in virtue of its immobility as a privileged frame relative
to which absolute motion, simultaneity, and length exist. Rather the relativistic ether is, as Kostro puts it,9 an ultra-referential reality to which the category
of motion does not even apply.
When Leftow infers from God's spacelessness that the distance between
God and spatial things is zero, he seems to commit the same error as would
someone who inferred from the ultra-referential status of the relativistic ether
that its motion is zero. Leftow defends his inference by asking how, if the
Zero Thesis and its equivalent "There is a distance between God and spatial
creatures, and this distance is zero" are ill-formed nonsense, we can understand them well enough to tell that they are equivalent. The answer is that
we understand analogous well-formed statements about spatially distant objects (and rest frames) well enough to see what has gone wrong in these
ill-formed statements about a spaceless being or an ultra-referential reality.
Leftow further defends his inference by asserting that the equivalent mentioned is problematic only if a zero distance is a positive distance. By "positive" he does not mean positive in the numerical sense, for that would be not
merely problematic but contradictory. Rather he means positive in the sense
of ontological status. But if Leftow means to assert more than a category-negation, he must be ascribing positive, existential status to the zero distance
between creatures and God. That is just as problematic as ascribing zero
motion to the relativistic ether. Finally, Leftow defends his Zero Thesis by
claiming that it is an entailment of the true and intelligible statement that
"Necessarily, there is no distance between God and any spatial thing." But
this statement is true and intelligible only insofar as it is a category-negation,
and as such it does not entail the Zero Thesis.
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What is disquieting about this apparent failure of the Zero Thesis is that
Leftow's entire theory of divine eternity appears to balance like an inverted
pyramid on this Thesis, so that with the untenability of that thesis the whole
theory threatens to topple. Without the Zero Thesis, I do not know how to
save Leftow's theory, for without it there is no "frame of reference" in which
all things exist changelessly relative to God-which fact should become
clearer as we proceed.
According to Leftow, the Zero Thesis has a startling consequence: since
the distance between God and any creature is always the same (zero), there
is no motion relative to God. Now, of course, in the sense of a category-negation there is no motion relative to God, since God is not a reference frame
any more than is the relativistic ether. But Leftow takes this consequence to
mean that God is or has a reference frame and that the motion of things in
space relative to that frame is zero. He writes, "That there is no motion
relative to God does not entail that there is no motion relative to other things.
There is nothing problematic in the thought that an object at rest in one frame
of reference (e.g., God's) is in motion in other reference-frames."10 What is
problematic, however, is the slide from speaking colloquially of God's "frame
of reference" to treating this as a sort of reference frame related relativistically to other physical reference frames. A reference frame is a conventional
standard of rest relative to which measurements can be made and experiments
described. In STR our concern is specifically with inertial frames, which are
reference frames comprising certain regions of space and time within which,
to some specified degree of accuracy, every test particle which is initially at
rest remains at rest and every test particle that is initially in motion continues
that motion without change in speed or direction. 11 Such a conception obviously cannot be applied to God in any literal sense; He has no reference frame
as such. But then it is simply inept to speak of objects at rest (zero motion)
relative to God.

(b.) Thesis (M)
Leftow proceeds to broach the following thesis, which he characterizes as
"eminently defensible": 12
M. There is no change of any sort involving spatial, material entities unless
there is also a change of place, i.e. a motion involving some material entity.

This is a sweeping claim which would require for its defense some account
of what constitutes a change (cf. Cambridge changes). But let that pass. I
simply want to observe at this point that (M) is incompatible with a tensed,
or (to borrow McTaggart's convenient terminology) A-theory of time. For
according to that theory, the physical world undergoes objective changes in
tense; indeed, this is the essence of temporal becoming. There are tensed
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facts, such as that It is now t, that are constantly changing whether anything
changes spatially or not. 13 Temporal change does not entail spatial change. 14
Insofar as he endorses (M), therefore, Leftow is implicitly endorsing a tenseless, or B-theory of time. This conclusion is important because Leftow avers
that his theory is compatible with an A-theory of time and becoming.

(c.) Reduction of Time to Physical Time
Since there can be no spatial motion relative to God, (M) is said to imply
that no spatial thing can change in any way in relation to God. Leftow then
goes on to make the surprising assertion that "if there is any truth in contemporary physics," then even non-spatial entities such as changeable angels or
disembodied souls do not exist. ls He justifies this assertion by pointing out
that time is one of the dimensions in the four-dimensional space-time manifold and that whatever is located in one dimension is ipso facto located in
the others as well. Therefore, if it is correct to represent time as a dimension
of the manifold, nothing can be in time unless it is also in space; only spatial
things are temporal. Since only temporal things can change, it follows that
only spatial things can change.
One could quarrel with this argument on the grounds that it takes insufficient cognizance of the difference between coordinate time and parameter
time. Insofar as time plays the role of a coordinate, it is connected with a
system of spatial coordinates, so that anything to which a temporal coordinate
can be assigned is such that spatial coordinates are assignable as well. But
insofar as time functions as a parameter, it is independent of space, and
something which possesses temporal location and extension need not, arguably, be held to exist in space as well. In Newtonian mechanics, time plays
the role of a parameter, not a coordinate, and, interestingly, the same is true
of Einstein's formulation of STR-the familiar space-time formulation derives later from Minkowski. STR can be validly formulated in either way.
Moreover, since STR is a local theory only, we must, in order to achieve a
global perspective, consider time as it functions in GTR-based cosmological
models, which Leftow neglects to do.
But let all that pass. My reservations about Leftow's argument at this point
are much more deeply laid; namely, I have deep misgivings about the very
conception of time which seems to underlie his reasoning. Leftow's argument
appears to rest upon a crucial presupposition that will affect fundamentally
one's theory of eternity and time and therefore deserves to be discussed at
some length, namely, a reductionistic equation of time and space with physical time and space.
In making this assumption, it must be admitted, Leftow does stand within
the mainstream of philosophy of space and time since Mach. 16 Under the
influence of Mach's positivism, twentieth century philosophy of space and
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time has been dominated by a reductionistic, verificationist conception of
time which equates time with time as it plays a role in physics. Physicists
and philosophers of space and time during the first half of this century shared
alike Mach's abhorrence for what was called "metaphysics." An instructive
piece is a 1941 article by Henry Margenau ostensibly defending metaphysical
elements in physics. Observing that "our time appears to be distinguished by
its taboos, among which there is to be found the broad convention that the
word metaphysics must never be used in polite scientific society," Margenau
counters that there not only are, but ought to be, metaphysical elements in
physical science. 17 But then he emasculates this bold contention by explaining
that he means thereby that we must have "epistemology"; but as physicists
"we reject ontology."18 He reduces metaphysics to what he calls the methodology of science, and insists that we must not relax our standards here, lest
the "obnoxious ontological elements" find their way back into science. 19
What these elements are he leaves in no doubt: the luminiferous aether and
simultaneity in different Lorentz frames are classed along with the external
world and the Ding-an-sich and dismissed as "ultra-perceptory and hence
meaningless."2o This jildgement is based on the "positivistic criticism" that
propositions not verifiable in principle are meaningless, a criterion which
elicits Margenau's ringing endorsement: "this recognition should be one of
the premisses of philosophy of science; it enjoys, indeed, almost universal
consent."21 As a result of positivism's influence, contemporary philosophy of
space and time has implicitly and almost unquestioningly been the philosophy
of physical time and space.
But the question arises, why should we follow in the Machian train? This
is a philosophical, not a scientific, question. Rejection of the equation between time and physical time would not contradict "any truth in contemporary
physics." What the reductionist fails to appreciate is that time as it plays a
role in physics may be but a pale abstraction of a much richer metaphysical
reality. Newton realized this when he drew a distinction between time itself
and our "sensible measures" of time. People "defile the purity of mathematical and philosophical truths who confound real quantities with their relations
and sensible measures."22 I am not here plumping for a substantivalist, as
opposed to relational, view of time, but merely saying that however time is
constituted, there is no reason to think it identical with the measurement
procedures which are used to define time operationally in physics.
Take, for example, the question of the status of temporal becoming. According to Newton, time itself "flows equably without relation to anything
external, and by another name is called duration ... this duration ought to be
distinguished from what are only sensible measures thereof.. .. "23 In time
itself physical events become successively present; but Newton seems to
leave it open whether this aspect of time is preserved in our physical measures
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of time. A persuasive case can be made, I think, that physical time is a
tenseless, B-theoretical time which has been abstracted from the richer Atheoretical metaphysical time in order to rid scientific theories of indexical
elements and thus render them universalizable. Max Black explains:
It is easy to understand why theoretical physics should express its formal
results in a language that is independent of context, using formulas or sentences from which the occasion words are absent. This procedure has the
great advantage of no reconstruction of the original context being required
on the part of any reader. ... If a scientist were to say, 'I then saw a green
flash at the edge of the sun's disk,' anyone who was absent at the time of the
original observation would need to know who spoke, and where and when,
in order to obtain the intended information. No such supplementary information is needed in order to understand Boyle's law or any other freely repeatable scientific statement. 24

Because of its universalizing tendency, its abstraction from the here and now,
physical time does not seem to possess an A-theoretical structure. As a result,
Black went so far as to advise physicists to stop talking about "time" in their
theories and to refer to their own concept simply as "t"!25 This is no doubt
asking too much. But it does show that the simplistic equation between time
and physical time is illicit. Hence, (pace reductionists like Griinbaum, for
example) it does not follow from the B-theoretical structure of physical time
that temporal becoming is therefore mind-dependent or non-objective. As
Peter Kroes points out in his discriminating book Time: Its Structure and Role
in Physical Theories, the universality of the laws of physics seems to preclude
the introduction of the notion of the flow of time on the basis of these laws,
but that does not imply that temporal becoming is therefore unreal: "Whether
or not it is in principle impossible for physics to incorporate the flow of time
in its descriptions of physical reality, is still an open question. Up to the
present, all attempts to capture this mysterious but essential aspect of time
in the language of physics have failed."26 In Kroes's view, the notions of past,
present, and future are essential for what he calls "real time," even though,
in his judgement, these notions have yet to be successfully integrated into
physical time. The contention here is not that temporal becoming is incompatible with physical time; there are a number of ways of showing how, for
example, objective temporal becoming can be made compatible with STR,
as Leftow himself recognizes. But the point is that such an integration involves the introduction of something into physical time from outside physics;
physical theory itself knows nothing of A-determinations and temporal becoming. But these notions can be legitimately integrated with physical time
only if there exists a metaphysical time from which physical time has been
abstracted.
Even some positivist philosophers of science are willing to admit that
notions which find no proper place in the time of physics are quite legitimate
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once one broadens his scope of inquiry. Thus, Philipp Frank, who denounces
metaphysical sentences as meaningless, qualifies this by stating, " ... they are
meaningless as far as science is concerned."27 When we begin to ask questions of a broader scope, the meaningfulness of such sentences may emerge:
Our judgment about the usefulness of such expressions may change considerably if we consider the realm not only of physical facts in the narrower
sense (e.g., the motion of planets) but ask also for a general picture of the
world and include the phenomena of human behavior as facts to be represented. 28

Frank even goes so far as to state that here religious beliefs may enter the
picture-a commendable display of openness for a positivist philosopher!
Now obviously, Leftow does not regard metaphysical sentences as meaningless; but his view of time as constricted to the time of physics does seem
to be positivistic and reductionist, leading him in turn to deny the existence
of non-spatial, temporal beings and thus evincing a scientistic attitude which
even a positivist like Frank would consider too narrow. I am reminded in this
connection of Alvin Plantinga's advice to Christian philosophers that they
have their own agenda to pursue and should display more boldness and
autonomy over against the concerns which secular philosophy deems legitimate. 29 It would be ironic if a Christian philosopher like Leftow were, out of
some misplaced deference to the "truth of contemporary physics," led to
adopt a positivistic view of time and to deny, as a consequence, important
Christian doctrines pertinent to angelology/demonology and to the intermediate state of the soul after death. 30
Of course, Leftow's motivation for denying the existence of changeable
angels/demons and disembodied souls is clear: if there are non-spatial, changing beings, then there will exist a metaphysical time and, hence, a "frame of
reference" in which things are changing relative to God. But then it will be
false that all things are timelessly present to God in eternity. Therefore Leftow
is obliged to deny the existence of temporal, non-spatial beings. This he
accomplishes by the positivistic constriction of time to physical time. There
is not only a theological price to be paid for this reduction, however; since
physical time is a B-theoretic time only, Leftow's theory of the relationship
of eternity to time will be incompatible with the A-theory, which fact he is
anxious to deny.
(d.) Timeless Presence of Temporal Events to God

On the basis of the Zero Thesis, (M), and the constriction of time to physical
time, Leftow concludes that there is no change relative to God. Unfortunately,
none of the supporting theses for this inference is plausibly true. All of the
errors described thus far seem to come home to roost in the following conclusion: "So if a frame of reference is a system of objects at rest relative to
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one another, then it appears that God and all spatial objects share a frame of
reference, one in which nothing changes."3! This conclusion is analogous to
the statement that spatial objects and space-time (the relativistic ether) are at
rest relative to one another and therefore exist in a common reference frameas though God or space-time could be said to constitute a reference frame
and so be at rest with respect to spatial objects or to exist in the same reference
frame as spatial objects!
Since an event occurring in one reference frame occurs in all (albeit simultaneous with different groups of events), explains Leftow, all events which
occur in other reference frames also occur in the frame at rest relative to God.
All temporal events are therefore timelessly present to God. By invoking
Relativity Theory at this point in his argument, Leftow is able to stave off
the Eleatic conclusion that because God is changeless and there is no change
relative to God, therefore motion and change are mere illusions masking a
static reality. By holding that change is real in physical reference frames and
making all change relative change, Leftow is able to hold that while change
is real relative to some frames it is non-existent relative to God's "frame."
But the difficulty I have with this account of how all temporal events can
be timelessly existent relative to God's "frame of reference" is that there just
does not seem to be any such "frame of reference" in which all events are
simultaneous. Certainly there is no such physical reference frame, and the
addition to these of God's "frame of reference" does not seem to change the
picture, since the timelessness of events in the eternal frame depends upon
the defective Zero Thesis, (M), and the reduction of time to physical time.
Unless some more secure foundation can be found for the existence of such
a frame, it will remain problematic how all temporal events can exist timelessly relative to God.
(ii) The Compatibility of the Timeless Presence of All Things

to God in Eternity and Objective Temporal Becoming
(a.) Local Simultaneity in God's "Frame"

On the basis of his argument for tenet (i) Leftow claims that" ... relative to
God, the whole span of temporal events is always actually there, all at once.
Thus in God's frame of reference, the correct judgment of local simultaneity
is that all events are simultaneous."32 This is a dark saying. If we are to make
sense of it, we must construe "always" to mean something like "tenselessly,"
since God's frame of reference is timeless, not sempiternal. For the same
reason, Leftow cannot mean by "simultaneous" "occurring at the same time,"
but something like "co-existent" or "coincident." The statement that God
judges all events to be locally simultaneous is very obscure. He cannot mean
that all events exist in God's timeless frame of reference, but are tenselessly
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ordered by a "later than" relation such that no event occurs (tenselessly) later
than any other, for that would be to affirm that there is only one time and all
events occur at that moment of time. If we take literally Leftow's appeal to
STR's doctrine of the relativity of simultaneity to reference frames, then we
must say that just as a given set of causally unconnectable events will be
calculated to sustain among themselves different relations of "earlier than,"
"simultaneous with," and "later than," in various reference frames, so in
God's "frame of reference" no events are judged to be earlier or later than
any other or even as occurring simultaneously. Rather in God's "frame" all
events are judged to be timelessly coincident. In other words, in God's "frame
of reference" the very topology of time is voided. It would be as though one
took the series of real numbers and removed from it any ordering relation
such as "greater than." The one-dimensional temporal continuum has been
divested in God's "frame of reference" of those topological properties which
make it isomorphous to a geometrical line, so that all that is left is an amorphous collection of points. Notice that in God's "frame" even causally connected events, such as one's birth, development, decline, and death, are
judged to sustain no temporal relations among themselves; they are all just
timelessly coincident. It might be objected that if God judges one's birth to
be coincident with one's death rather than earlier than it, then He is surely
deceived. But if we take relativity seriously, as Leftow wishes to do, that is
not the case. There is no privileged frame. Hence, no observer can impugn
the temporal ordering of events determined by any other observer in another
reference frame. Of course, in all physical frames the temporal order of
causally connectable events is invariant. But in the special case of God, if
Leftow's argument for (i) is correct, this invariance does not hold with respect
to His "frame of reference." In fact, if anyone's frame is privileged, it will
surely be God's, for the relativity of simultaneity arises only for events
spatially distant from the observer; judgements of local simultaneity are neither conventional nor relative. But given Leftow's Zero Thesis, all events are
in a sense local for God. Therefore, His judgement that all events are timelessly coincident should be absolute, and it is we who are deceived when we
judge that they are temporally ordered (shades of McTaggart!). In fact, it is
not clear to me that Leftow can avert also voiding space as well as time of
any topological properties in God's "frame of reference." For in Relativity
Theory, a difference in the value of the temporal coordinate of some event
relative to two distinct reference frames requires a mathematically determinate difference in the spatial coordinates of the event as well. Doubtless,
Leftow would not say that the Lorentz transformation equations hold relative
to God's "frame of reference" as for physical frames. Nonetheless, since an
event's spatial coordinates are partially dependent upon its temporal coordinates, events in God's "frame of reference," lacking any temporal coordi-
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nates, cannot be located in space either. To paraphrase Leftow: something is
located in one dimension of a geometry if and only if it is located in all; so
if it is correct to represent time as another dimension, it follows that whatever
is not in time is not in space either: only temporal things are spatial. It
therefore seems to follow that in God's "frame of reference" events not only
occur timelessly but spacelessly as well. The topological structure of the
four-dimensional space-time manifold has come completely unglued in the
divine "frame of reference" so that all God is confronted with is a chaotic
collection of points which are ordered neither spatially nor temporally.
Leftow, however, clearly does not interpret the "local simultaneity" of all
events in God's "frame of reference" in the above way. He states, "In eternity
events are in effect frozen in an array of positions corresponding to their
ordering in various B-series."33 In a footnote he explains that God does not
see all events spread out in one B-series, since each reference frame generates
its own unique B-series. There are thus a plurality of B-series and God must
be aware of all of them. 34 Now this seems an eminently more reasonable
account of the existence of temporal events in God's "frame of reference,"
but I do not see how this account concords with the theory of timeless eternity
developed under (i). It needs to be understood that that account does not
merely eliminate the A-determinations of events (monadic predicates like
past, present, and future) relative to the divine "frame of reference," for STR
itself takes no cognizance of such predicates in handling temporal relations
among events in physical reference frames. Rather Leftow's account must
also eliminate the B-determinations of events as well (dyadic predicates like
earlier than, simultaneous with, and later than) relative to God's "frame of
reference." For the relativity of simultaneity, which Leftow employs in order
to stave off the Parmenidean conclusion that change is illusory and reality is
a static whole, entails that events are classed relative to a reference frame as
being either earlier than, simultaneous with, or later than any arbitrarily
chosen point on the inertial trajectory of a hypothetical observer, and that
observers in different frames will draw at any arbitrary point on their worldlines different lines of simultaneity connecting events determined to be simultaneous with that point and dividing later from earlier events. Hence,
relative to God's timeless "frame of reference," God must judge of any two
events that one is neither earlier than the other, nor later, nor even strictly
simultaneous; they are just timelessly coexistent relative to His frame. Therefore, Leftow's theory must void even B-relations relative to the divine "frame
of reference." Of course, an omniscient God must also know the lines of simultaneity which would be drawn by hypothetical observers relative to any physical
reference frame; but in His "frame" events are chaotically co-existent.
If the proponent of divine timelessness wants to preserve the B-relations
among events, then it seems to me that his most plausible move will be to
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identify God's "frame of reference" with the four-dimensional space-time
manifold itself, which God transcends, and hold that that manifold exists
tenselessly. In short: the B-theory of time is correct. Given the B-theory of
time, the metaphorical and problematic notion of God's "frame of reference"
becomes perspicuous and it becomes easy to see what is meant by divine
timelessness and the presence of all things to God in eternity.

(b.) The Relativity of Simultaneity
Leftow, however, denies that his theory of divine eternity entails the B-theory.
He claims that " ... a defender of God's eternity can assert that (in a strictly
limited sense) one and the same event is present and actual in eternity though
it is not yet or no longer present or actual in time."35 He explicates this by
saying
That is, it can be true at a time t that an event dated at t+ I has not yet occurred
in time, and yet also correct at t to say that that very event exists in eternity.
That all events occur at once in eternity ... does not entail that they all occur
at once in time. 36

Unfortunately, it is not apparent to me that this explication is anything but
a statement of the B-theory. A B-theorist like Griinbaum would be adamant
that at t an event at t+l has not yet occurred in time (otherwise it would be
earlier than t) and nonetheless this event exists tenselessly with as much
actuality as the event at t; moreover, the B-theory does not assert the absurdity
that all events occur at once in time, for then there would be only one moment
of time! What Leftow needs to show is that his theory of the timeless existence of all things relative to God is compatible with the reality of tense, the
objectivity of temporal becoming, the denial that all events exist tenselessly,
and so forth.
It is at this point that the Einsteinian interpretation of STR takes center
stage in Leftow's defense. He argues,
If simultaneity and presentness are relative to referem:e-frames, then if present events are actual in some way in which future events are not, this sort
of actuality is itself relative to reference frames. Thus there is a (strictly
limited) sense in which the relativity of simultaneity entails a relativity of
actuality, if one restricts full actuality to present eventsY

This represents one way of integrating objective temporal becoming with
STR, though it strikes me as enormously implausible. Sklar notes that a
peculiarity of such a relativized view of becoming is that at my given spacetime point there will be events which are now such that they will be in my
real past at some future time, but which will never have a present reality to
me at all. 38 In fact, that is true of all events except for those lying on the
single thread of my inertial trajectory which passes vertically on a Minkowski
diagram through the vertex point of my past light cone. This follows from
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the fact that all events having a space-like separation from me or lying inside
or on my future-directed lightcone do not exist; at a later space-time point
vast numbers of such events will be past for me and therefore real, though
they were never present. Oddly enough, then, the present is not the moment
of becoming for most events. Since, on the A-theory of time, things in the
past, having become, are no longer existent, Sklar charges that the view under
discussion collapses into a relativistic solipsism, in which reality is reduced
to a single pointP9 On a theistic metaphysic, the charge of solipsism would
not quite be justified, since as well as what exists here-now, God also timelessly exists. That still seems to be a pretty attenuated reality. But, of course,
on Leftow's view, all events also exist timelessly in eternity with God. So
reality is restored in its fullness; even though in my reference frame no events
other than that which is here-now exist, nonetheless there is a reference frame
in which all events exist. This escape from solipsism depends on the truth of
tenet (i), which I have argued to be incoherent; but at least Leftow can claim
that his view is not further burdened by solipsism.
Leftow explains the result of relativizing actuality to reference frames:
If we take eternity as one more frame of reference, then, we can thus say that

a temporal event's being present and actual in eternity does not entail that it
is present and actual at any particular time in any temporal reference frame
(though it does follow that this event is, was or will be actual in all temporal
reference frames).4o

Again, I feel constrained to say that God's "frame of reference" is not literally
a reference frame; there is no reference frame in which all events are present
and actual, since there are in every frame space-time regions designated
absolute future or absolute past as determined by the light-cone structure at
any event. The only thing corresponding to God's "frame of reference" as
described by Leftow, so far as I can see, is Einstein's relativistic ether, the
space-time manifold itself. But since it is not a reference frame, the relativity
of simultaneity relation does not obtain between it and local frames. Temporal
becoming cannot be objective, for all events simply exist in the four-dimensional manifold. 41
In another place, Leftow shows himself prepared to fall back, if necessary,
to a sort of Stump-Kretzmann model which does not appeal to the Zero
Thesis, but relies exclusively on the relativity of simultaneity in order to
justify the claim that actuality is reference frame dependent and therefore
events which are not actual with respect to various temporal reference frames
may all be actual with respect to God's "frame."42 Suppose then that it is
legitimate to speak of eternity'S constituting a reference frame. My misgivings about Leftow's theory strike much deeper than anything heretofore expressed, indeed, at the very philosophical foundations of the interpretation of
Relativity Theory itself; namely, I, quite frankly, see no reason to think that
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the relativity of simultaneity obtains at all. Leftow's appeal to STR to ground
this relation, it seems to me, evinces a certain naivete concerning the philosophical foundations of the received physical interpretation of Relativity
Theory and an uncritical acceptance of that interpretation, which is then
(mis)appJied to metaphysics.
There are, after all, other physical interpretations of the Lorentz transformation equations that constitute the mathematical core of STR which are
empirically equivalent to the received interpretation and which, if correct,
would lead to completely different conclusions when applied metaphysically.
As the Australian physicist Geoffery Builder points out, the only formulation
of STR which is verifiable is "the theory that the spatial and temporal coordinates of events, measured in anyone inertial reference system, are related
to the spatial and temporal coordinates of the same events, as measured in
any other inertial reference system, by the Lorentz transformation."43 But this
verifiable statement is neutral, for example, with respect to the received
Einsteinian interpretation and the neo-Lorentzian interpretation championed
by Ives, Builder, Prokhovnik, and others.44 These two interpretations, while
empirically indistinguishable, are radically different due to the different ontologies presupposed. 45 On the Einsteinian view, there exists no preferred
spatio-temporal order; rather space and time are relative to inertial frames,
and no frame is privileged. According to the neo-Lorentzian view, absolute
space and time exist, not necessarily in the substantival, as opposed to relational, sense of "absolute," but rather in the sense that there exists a spatiotemporal order which is privileged. There exists a universal, fundamental (or
privileged) reference frame which is the analogue of the aether frame of
nineteenth century classical physics but without the classical aether and
which is usually identified with the frame of hypothetical fundamental observers stationary relative to the expansion of space itself as posited in current
cosmological models. Light is propagated isotropic ally at velocity c relative
to this fundamental frame alone and therefore will be propagated relative to
observers in motion with respect to this frame at velocities exceeding or less
than c. The consequence of motion relative to the fundamental frame will be
certain anisotropy effects produced by dynamical causes operating on the
moving systems, primarily length contraction in the direction of motion in
order that the internal equilibrium of the system might be maintained. Time
dilation effects follow immediately as a consequence of these anisotropy and
contraction effects, as may be seen from the behavior of a light clock in
motion relative to a frame at rest. It needs to be emphasized that on the
Einsteinian interpretation length contraction and time dilation are no less real
and objective physical effects, but there is under this interpretation no causal
explanation for these effects, which follow simply as deductions from the two
postulates of Einstein's formulation of the theory.46 Under the neo-Lorentzian
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interpretation, the constancy of the observed velocity of light relative to all
frames, observed length contraction of objects in motion relative to frames
taken to be at rest, and time dilation of clocks, including all physical and
biological systems, in motion relative to an observer taken to be at rest
become physically intelligible, rather than mere postulates or deductions
lacking physical explanation.
Although it is often asserted that Einstein's version of the theory is simpler
and therefore to be preferred, the claim that the Einsteinian interpretation is
simpler is incorrect. Although Lorentz's own theory was more complicated
than Einstein's, H. E. Ives was able to derive the Lorentz transformation
equations from (i) the laws of conservation of energy and momentum and (ii)
the laws of transmission of radiant energy. He showed that there is an apparent
discrepancy in the equations for a particle governed by these laws which
demands that the particle's mass vary with velocity. He then derived from
these variations of dimensions the Lorentz transformations. "The space and
time concepts of Newton and Maxwell are retained without alteration," he
wrote, "It is the dimensions of the material instruments for measuring space
and time that change, not space and time that are distorted."47 On Ives's
achievement, Martin Ruderfer comments that he succeeded in elevating
Lorentz's ad hoc theory to an equal status with STR and did so with the same
number of basic assumptions as Einstein, so that his theory has the same
"beauty." "The I ves and Einstein interpretations represent two different, but
equally valid, views of the same set of observations."48
We thus have two different interpretations of Relativity Theory which are
radically different in their metaphysical foundations and yet which are, to
date, experimentally indistinguishable and therefore insusceptible to scientific adjudication. An examination of the philosophical foundations of Relativity Theory is therefore indispensable if we are to decide between these
competing interpretations. Unfortunately, space does not permit me to delve
into this fascinating issue here. 49 But if a neo-Lorentzian interpretation is
philosophically preferable (as I suspect that it is), then the rug is pulled from
beneath the feet of theories of divine eternity appealing to STR in order to
justify notions like ET-simultaneity or the presence of all things to God in
timeless eternity. It therefore seems to me that it is of the utmost moment that
proponents of divine timeless eternity address themselves more closely to the
scrutiny and justification of the interpretation of Relativity Theory which they
prefer and on which their theories are predicated.

Conclusion
In conclusion, then, I think we can agree that there are reasons to doubt the
legitimacy of the appeal to Relativity Theory to support the crucial theses (i)
that temporal things exist in time and in timeless eternity and (ii) that the

34

Faith and Philosophy

timeless presence of all things to God is compatible with objective temporal
becoming. The first of these rests upon category mistakes, presupposes a
reductionist view of time, and seems incompatible with a tensed theory of
time. The second involves the same conceptual mistakes, but also hinges upon
a particular interpretation of STR which, though widespread, may by no
means be the most plausible. It seems to me that a more promising route for
defenders of divine timelessness to pursue would involve the explicit adoption of a B-theory of time and the explication of a transcendent being's
relations to the space-time manifold-but then, of course, they must face up
to the case for the superiority of the A-theory over the B-theory.
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